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A B S T R A C T
Meta-ethics aims at considering questions and problems of fundamental 
importance to ethics as a science. A central aspect of meta-ethics deals 
with the character of ethical statements. A re they capable of verification? 
Th is  is the question examined by th is paper. Many d iffering  answers 
have been proposed to the question but where many answers fa lte r is in 
the ir neglect to give attention to the tru ly  scientific nature of e th ics. 
It  is proposed that the approach of W. Pannenberg is to be followed 
whereby ethics must be viewed in a scientific w ay. C hristian  ethical 
th inking  must take the resu lts in other branches of science and make 
use of them, applying them to C h ris t ian ity  and theology as the science 
of God. The views of Karl Popper on the notion of a hypothesis are seen 
to o ffer possibilities for attaining the scientific character of ethical 
statements.
The aim of this artic le  is to consider one central aspect of the field of 
meta-ethics - that of the character of ethical statements and their v e r­
ification . Section one gives attention to the context of ethical statements 
by treating the task of meta-ethics itse lf as seen within the context of 
C h ristian  ethics in general. Section two investigates the d ifferent ap­
proaches which have been adopted towards the character of ethical 
statements and their verifica tion . The views of individual ethical scholars 
are presented in order to formulate the d ifferent approaches more c lea rly , 
and an evaluation is made of the ir specific attempts. Here I do not limit 
myself to specifica lly  C hristian  th in ke rs , but will consider the views of 
ethical philosophers in general, which will later form the basis for a 
C h ristian  approach to the question. As a result of these d ifferent views, 
section three attempts to formulate an approach for a satisfacto ry  theory
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of the verification of ethical statements within the context of Christian 
m eta-ethics.
1. M ETA -ETH ICS WITHIN THE CO N TEXT OF CH R ISTIA N  ETH IC S
1.1 Christian  ethics
The word ethics is used today to re fer to a branch of philosophy which 
concerns th inking philosopically about morality and its problems, it is the 
science of morality (R e in er, 1964:15). O rig inally the term ethics came 
from the Greek word c&os which meant customs, morals or inclination. 
In latin this was translated by the word mos (p i. m ores), also meaning 
customs, or habits, and from which come our English words morals and 
m orality. In the course of time morality took on the meaning of the 
totality of the accepted rules of behaviour of a group (R e in e r, 1964:15). 
Eth ics is seen as reflection about this life and its norms; it introduces 
an inq u iry  into the general principles lying behind this way of life and 
undertakes reflection into new problems to which traditional moral ph i­
losophy can give no answers.
The reflection about morality is as old as man himself. A classical example 
of this ethical reflection is seen in the dialogues of Plato, especially in 
the example of Socrates who is faced with death and weighs up the ethical 
reasons for the way he should act. As an Athenian, Socrates saw that 
it was his duty to respect his sentence given by the court. If he were 
to escape, he would have rejected this duty which he saw so clearly : 
he would have despised the whole Athenian constitution and moral code. 
His duty was to d rink  the hemlock (P lato , 1970:87).
The Christian  believer is also occupied with the task of ethical reflection. 
He is a follower of C h ris t , and as such his life is stamped by the person 
and presence of C h ris t (N iebuhr, 1963:43). The Christian  life should 
not be seen as something totally d ifferent from other ways of human life . 
A person is a person, whether he be a Buddhist, Jew , Mohammedan, 
A the ist: his nature is the same. In so fa r as all people have the same 
fundamental human nature they all experience the same exigencies and 
demands, they all come under the same law. Christian  life should be 
seen as a fu rth er dimension of human moral life in general. Christian
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ethics is an attempt to understand this human moral life from a Christian  
standpoint (N iebuhr, 1963:45).
A C h ristian  believer must reflect upon his human life from a Christian  
standpoint, but this reflection must be undertaken' in a discip lined, 
system atic way ( i .e .  in a scientific way) if his thought and efforts are 
to achieve fru itfu ln e ss  and success. Once more this aspect of eth ics, 
as a science, goes back to the beginnings of western c iv ilisation , to the 
reflection of the G reeks.
1.2 The d ifferent branches of fchristian ethics
C h ristian  eth ics , as a scientific  d iscip line, has in the course of its de­
velopment been divided ch iefly  into four branches:
1 .2 .1  D escriptive-exp lanatory ethics
T h is  title  indicates the task with which ethics is concerned, namely that 
of describ ing morals and customs in specific groups at concrete h istorical 
times. One finds d escrip tive  ethics above all in the works of cu ltura l 
anthropologists, sociologists and social anthropologists. In th is regard 
there is an interaction between the cu ltura l anthropologist and the ethical 
scho lar: the cu ltu ra l anthropologist cannot work without an ethical the­
o ry , and the ethical scholar cannot work without a knowledge of morals 
in d iverse  cu ltura l context and cu ltu res. The C h ristian  ethical scholar 
trie s  to describe and explain ethical phenomena from a C hristian  v iew ­
point. Th is  branch of ethics rests upon empirical moral facts and at­
tempts to describe and explain them. An example of a typ ica l undertaking 
in th is regard would be: What are the views of A fricans today with re ­
gard to marriage?
1 .2 .2  Normative ethics
It is not su ffic ien t to describe what people do, but normative ethics goes 
fu rth e r and inquires about the princip les of standards behind the actions. 
Its  task is to establish ethical norms or guidelines for action. It sets 
as its goal the formulation of basic princip les and even formulates h y ­
potheses which are then to be tested by practice . Normative ethics has
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an evaluative function in which it passes judgment on actions and ap­
praises them. It searches for a rational justification for one’s actions 
based upon norms and princip les. In the course of h istory two ap­
proaches in this field have predominated: the teleological and the 
deontological approaches.
Teleology is derived from the Greek word telos, which means a goal. 
Th is approach searches for an all-encompassing goal which is used to 
judge man's actions and decisions. One such approach is that of hedonism 
in which the all-encompassing goal for man’s actions is seen to be 
p leasure, or the elimination of unhappiness and su ffe ring . Th is is an 
ancient ethical philosophy whose prim itive form is found in the Greeks 
A ristippus and Ep icu ru s. But it has made its appearance throughout the 
centu ries, and a newly developed hedonistic theory of actions is found 
in the "Vienna Schule" in the writings of Moritz Sr.hlick (I882-193G). 
There pleasure is seen both as the highest good or final goal for action, 
and as the motive for all man's actions: all human actions are induced 
by pleasure (R e in er, 1964:41).
Deontological ethics comes form the Greek word deon, which means duty 
and re fers to what ought to be done. It concerns actions which co rre­
spond to a norm. Th is approach is found c learly  expressed in Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804): all man's actions are to correspond to an unconditional 
d u ty . Eth ics then is the formal stru ctu re  of moral du ty . When the 
question: "What must I do?" is raised , it does not concern the goal to 
which I must direct my actions, but rather the moral duty or norms on 
which I must base my actions.
1 .2 .3  Special ethics
Th is  d irects attention to a specific area of human life . Here descriptive 
ethics and normative ethics are brought to bear upon one aspect of human 
life . Moral problems are mostly ve ry  concrete and specific . Thus there 
is a need for an applied eth ics, a material e th ics , o r as it is called a 
special e th ics. Attention is given to questions and problems dealing with 
such aspect of man's life as medicine (medical e th ic s ) , sex (sexual eth­
ic s ) , society (social eth ics) and economics (economic e th ics).
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1.2.4 Meta-ethics
The term meta-ethics is ve ry  recent, appearing only during the last 
quarter of a century in moral textbooks, especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. From an etymological point of view meta-ethics is used to refer 
to something coming after' e th ics, or something being about* eth ics. 
It has developed parallel to a branch of science called metascience whose 
task sim ilarly concerns asking the fundamental questions dealing with 
science. Radnitzky (1970:6) gives a good definition of metascience:
Metascience as conceived here is a scientific discip line which ac­
cumulates knowledge about the scientific en te rp rise , which checks 
this knowledge in a systematic way and organises it into knowledge 
system s.
T h is , too, is the task of meta-ethics and one can apply these words of 
Radnitzky to meta-ethics as well. It is also a discip line which has as its 
goal accumulating knowledge about ethics as a d isc ip line, and it aims at 
checking this knowledge in a systematic way and organises it into 
knowledge systems.
The basic task of meta-ethics is to consider questions and problems which 
are of fundamental importance to ethics as a science. It looks over the 
shoulders as it were of d escrip tive , normative and special e th ics, and 
considers questions such as the possib ility  or impossibility of the v e r if i­
cation of ethical-norm ative statements. P reviously such questions were 
treated together with normative eth ics , but today a special branch of 
ethics has developed in order to give due attention and weight to these 
fundamental question. Meta-ethics aims at considering the in depth 
questions related to e th ics . It  considers the question regarding the 
method which should be adopted in treating an ethical question, as well 
as the scientific  nature of eth ics. It considers the fundamental meaning 
of such ethical terms as good, as duty and as obligation. In what 
language-contexts are they used? What meaning do they have, and do 
they always have th is meaning? A central aspect of meta-ethics deals 
with the character of ethical statements: Does is add something to 
knowledge? Is it capable of verification? In treating these topics, or 
answering these questions, various approaches have been adopted in
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meta-ethics: naturalism , intuitionalism , non-cognitivism , prescriptionism , 
re lativism . Attention will be devoted to these in Section 2.
A fundamental question related to the whole ab ility  to make ethical 
statements and the value which can be attributed to them is that of the 
is-ought question. A very  common way of proceeding in ethical state­
ments is to state a fact and from that draw out an obligation, for example 
in 1 John 4 :7  : "Beloved let us love one another: for love is of God 
. . .  " Because God is love, John orders his readers that they must love 
one another.
Th is line of argument proceeding from a statement of fact to an obligation 
was questioned f irs t  of all by David Hume:
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met w ith, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
o rd inary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, 
or makes observations concerning human a ffa irs ; when of a sudden 
I am surprised to find , that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not (F rankena , 1974:368).
Many scho lars, such as Henry Sidgwich and R .M . Hare, following on 
Hume, have adopted the attitude that an ought cannot be derived from 
an is , an obligation cannot be derived from a statement of fact. T h is  
has come to be known as 'Hume's Law ', and is a question which ineta- 
ethics must consider, fo r it is fundamental to any ethical statements that 
are made.
The d ifferent approaches within meta-ethics should not be seen as e x ­
c lusive or contradictory approaches (ju s t as the different branches of 
ethics itse lf should not be seen as contrad icto ry , but rather as comple­
m entary) . What is v e ry  often the case is that the supporter of each 
approach is s tru ck  by those features of our ethical concepts which favour 
his own theory and d iscred it the others. There  is a measure of truth  
in all of these approaches, and it is th is which should be kept in mind 
(Toulm in, 1968:190).
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2. THE CH A RA CTER  OF ETH IC A L  STATEM EN TS AND TH EIR  J U S T I­
FICATIO N
Reference has already been made to the d ifferent approaches which have 
been adopted towards the cha iacte r of an ethical statement and in what 
way it can be justified  or ve rified . These approaches will now be con­
sidered in detail.
2.1 Naturalism and definism
2.1 .1  The Position
A knowledge of the meaning of ethical terms such as good, rig h t, honest, 
e t c .,  will help one in ascertaining whether such judgments as Th is is 
good' e t c .,  are ju stified . The justification of ethical judgments rests 
upon the definition of ethical term s. Th is was the basis behind the d i­
alogues of Socrates, in which , through his d iscussions, he was searching 
for the answer to the question: What is good, beauty, tru th , e tc .? ' 
The defin ist and the naturalist hold that ethical terms such as good, 
rig h t, e t c .,  can be explained or translated into d ifferent term s. Where 
they d iffe r is solely in so fa r as the defin ist maintains they can be 
translated into metaphysical term s, while the natu ra list maintains that 
they must be in non-metaphysical terms (F ran ken a , 1974:370). If this 
approach were justified  it would have a great advantage for one would 
have a firm basis , empiricism, on which to re ly  in ethical d iscussions. 
Naturalism attempts to give an explanation for the connection between the 
value of something and its empirical ch aracte ris tics . Thus whether 
something is good, bad, wrong, ju s t , can be derived from the empirical 
characteristics of the th ing . Most supporters of the eth ica l, naturalistic 
theory begin with the concept good' and offer a definition of it . From 
it they hold all other ethical terms can be derived , e .g . A ristotle defines 
the good as that as which all things aim’ (F rankena , 1974:313).
R .B .  Perry  is a typ ical example of a natu ra list. He defines the concept 
of value f irs t  of a ll:
A thing - anything - has value , or is valuable , in the orig inal and 
generic sense when it is the object of an interest - any in terest.
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Or whatever is the object of interest is ipso facto valuable 
(F ran ken a , 1974:372).
From this definition he attempts to define other ethical concepts such as 
morality and the moral good. For him the moral good is defined in the 
special sense as a character which is given to objects as a result of in ­
terests which are harmoniously organised. Th is  is the standard which 
is used for actions and judgments: that which is good is that which is 
conducive towards harmonious happiness. Th is is waht is termed the 
'moral f ir s t  p rincip le '. He advances reasons in support of this definition 
of the moral good by showing that this definition avoids egocentracism 
which has plagued ethics before, in which all interests have been sub­
ordinated either to the ir own interests or those of their neighbour. Since 
it maintains that the good is a harmonious happiness, it remains impartial 
because the interest of the one who makes the judgment is merely one 
among many other in terests.
From this definition of the moral good. Perry  proceeds to deduce all the 
other v irtues held in high regard throughout the centuries. It upholds 
as well the Golden Rule, because the harmonious happiness of all demands 
that each person should put himself in the place of the other and 
recognise the other’s interests as well. Th is  fundamental definition of 
the good should become the basis on which people judge and critic ise  
everyth ing  - the ir conscience, society, law, economy (F rankena, 
1974:380).
2 .1 .2  Evaluation of this approach
A strong criticism  of the naturalist approach arose especially from the 
supporters of intuitionism. One of the basic objections is due to the 
definition which is given to terms such as good. There is no universal 
agreement as regards the exact definition of good. Some will define good 
as meaning pleasant, while others w ill describe it as meaning happiness. 
What they are really  saying is that most people use the term to re fer to 
pleasant, etc . But then they say that one ought to act in th is way, 
because most people use a certain word to re fer to such and such 
(F rankena , 1974:386).
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G .E .  Moore developed a test called the open-question test and he applied 
it to definism . He found that the latter did not stand up to the test. 
If  I define good as p leasure, then I ask whether all good things are 
pleasurable? As long as this question can be posed, then good and 
pleasurable acts are not identical. Th is can be presented in general 
term s: if I state that two term s, A and B mean the same th ing, then the 
test is whether all As are B s . As long as this question can be posed, 
A and B are not identical. Moore shows how closed th is type of approach 
is : it rests solely upon this false definition of what the good is , and 
rejects any other opinion in this regard (F rankena, 1974:391).
A fu rth e r criticism  came form the side of R .M . Hare, neither a definist 
nor an in tu ition ist, in his book The Language of Morals. There he argues 
(F rankena , 1974:398) that value judgments cannot be derived from 
em pirical-factual judgments. He has pointed out that value terms have 
an important function in language, namely that of commending. When 
value terms are translated into empirical terms they thereby lose an es­
sential aspect, the funciton of commending. For this reason a naturalist 
cannot define, for example, the term good with reference to some em­
pirica l ch aracte ris tics . V . Briimmer (n .d .:1 0 0 )  elaborates upon this 
fallacy by applying it to value judgments and shows that in the process 
of an argument, it is not possible to proceed from a factual judgment 
immediately to an evaluative conclusion. It is necessary to include a value 
judgment as w ell. For example, from the empirical fact that a tape- 
recorder allows batteries to last fo r 50 hours' p laying time, one cannot 
immediately pass the evaluative judgement that the tape-recorder is good. 
One must also include in this argument the evaluative judgment that 
tape-recorders which allow betteries to play for f if ty  hours are good. 
From th is one is justified  in concluding that my tape-recorder is good. 
Evaluative conclusions can only be drawn from empirical facts plus a value 
judgment, and not simply from a statement which includes only an 
em pirical-factual judgement.
Naturalism and definisrn have not really  succeeded in answering the 
question of the justification of ethical statements. Values are not simply 
factual or empirical characte ristics or definitions of such . It is true that 
there is some connection between value judgements and factual state*
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merits, but arguments, as has been shown, cannot simply be drawn from 
a factual statement because the aspect of commendation is m issing,
2 .2  Intuitionism and non-naturalism
2.2 .1  The position
The term intuitionism arose as a result of the critique of G .E . Moore on 
naturalism , referred to above. As a view it was f irs t  worked out in the 
eighteenth century by Richard Price and Thomas Reid, though elements 
of this view can possibly be traced back to Plato. The intuitionists insist 
that in order to come to an evaluative conclusion it is necessary that one 
must have at least one ethical premise in the argument. The question 
then arises concerning the ethical premise: How does one a rr ive  at this 
premise? Is it arb itary? The intuitionists maintain that the basic , ethical 
words which one uses are untranslatable and indefinable. (T h is  is in 
d irect opposition to natu ra lism .) These ethical words, however, are not 
a rb it ra ry , but are seen to be self-evident. One obtains an immediate 
knowledge, which is simple and unique.
Sometimes intuitionism is re ferred  to as non-naturalism . Th is  emphasises 
that these simple, indefinable concepts are non-etnpirical, that is they 
cannot be translated into empirical concepts. One does not observe, for 
example, good as one does a shape or a colour, like yellow. One a rrives  
at moral values through 'in tu ition ', but with th is concept they wish to 
oppose every  form of subjectivism . By means of intuition they maintain 
that in all judgments of value one gives objective information, and they 
are not an expression of one's own subjective feeling . According to them 
intuition itse lf is a special kind of judgment, which is made by means of 
an extra  sense which man possesses. T h is  renders ethical concepts 
se lf-ev ident, simple and objective. G .E .  Moore is without doubt the most 
important representative of intuitionism during this century and the views 
of intuitionism can be c learly  seen from his work Princip ia Eth ica . He 
maintains that statements about the good, e t c .,  are synthetic and never 
analytica l. Th is  rules out the view of the naturalists of try ing  to define 
ethical concepts by means of only one definition. It is impossible to 
maintain that pleasure is the only good'. The concept of good is seen 
as being one of those finale or ultimate terms by means of which anything
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that is able to be defined must be defined. Good itself cannot be defined 
for it is a simple term, not complex, without any p arts . For Moore the 
fundamental princip les must all be se lf-evident. By this lie understands 
that the term or proposition is evident by itself alone: no reasons can 
be given to prove that it is such . If one were to give a reason for it 
being evident, then it is obviously not self-evident (F rankena, 1974:392).
2 .2 .2  Evaluation of this approach
In order to defend their own position the naturalists have pointed out 
certain weaknesses with regard to this approach concerning the justi 
fication of ethical statements. For example, R .B .  Perry  shows that by 
saying that valuable means simply valuable' the intu ition ists are not 
adding to knowledge of ethical concepts in any way (F rankena , 1974:394). 
They are involved in a form of verbalism . He also points out that one 
cannot attribute a simple meaning to any word in the sense that it lias 
a unique meaning which never undergoes any change The meanings 
which words have always undergo constant change due to the development 
of man himself (F rankena , 1974:396).
A fru th e r d ifficu lty  arises from the wish of intuitionism to uphold the 
ob jectiv ity  of values. But they have not been able to propose reasons 
which will uphold this ob jectiv ity . When two people disagree about the 
value of something, how is one to decide which person's intuition is the 
right one? How is one to d istinguish between true intuition and what 
might be termed pseudo-intuition ? As with naturalism , intuitionism has 
maintained the knowledge character of ethical statements which is an im­
portant aspect. However, it has not been able to uphold against all 
criticism  its basic contention that values are intuitions.
2 .3  Non-cognitivism or non-descriptive views
2 .3 .1  The position
The two previous approaches agreed on one point, namely, the knowledge 
character of ethical statements, although they differed in their explana­
tion of this knowledge-content. As a result of criticism  of this 
epistemological character in the 1930 s the pendulum swung to another
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approach in eth ics, namely that of the ’emotive theory’ . Th is position 
laid stress upon the emotions or feelings in an ethical statement. A l­
though it received popularity in this cen tu ry , aspects of this approach 
can be traced back to the writings of Hume and Adam Smith in the 
eighteenth cen tu ry , In the course of its presentation, the emphasis on 
the emotions has undergone many changes. Since 1936 the most radical 
exponent has been A .J .  A ye r. C .L .  Stevenson attempted to improve 
upon this theory in 1944. Because of differences in these approaches, 
it is best to refer to th is trend by what is at least common to them and 
to call them non-cognitive or non-descriptive theories’ (Frankena, 
1974:406).
2 .3 .2  The emotivism of A .J .  Ayer
A yer admits that the fundamental ethical concepts are incapable of being 
analysed because there is no criterion by which one can test the valid ity 
of the judgments in which they occur. A yer maintains that if one were 
to say to someone: It was wrong of you to steal that money’ , then one 
says nothing more than if one had simply said : You stole that money*. 
By adding the words it was wrong of you' one has not added anything 
new about the action. What one has done is to express one's feelings. 
The same thing could have been achieved by using a special tone of voice 
when one said you stole that money*. If it was written one could have 
expressed one’s feelings by means of exclamation marks (Frankena, 
1974:408). A yer therefore draws the conclusion that in every  case where 
one is usually understood to be making an ethical judgment, the function 
which the ethical term has is merely an emotive function - it expresses 
the feelings of the speaker but makes no factual-content statement con­
cerning the object. Because ethical terms and judgments intend to e x ­
press the feeling of the speaker, and to arouse feelings in others, they 
do not possess any objective va lid ity . Since they refer only to feelings, 
they cannot fall under the category of truth  or falsehood.
A fu rth e r consequence of this theory is that it is impossible to dispute 
about questions of value because one is dealing with feelings or emotions. 
One wishes one's opponent in a discussion to adopt the same moral a tt i­
tude as oneself, but there is no way in which one can bring forward 
arguments to show that one system is better than another (Frankena,
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1974:412). It leads to the ultimate in subjectivism  in that it is impossible 
to argue or discuss about questions of value. The problem is evident 
when two completely d ifferent attitudes or feelings are expressed - there 
is no way of deciding which one should follow (Toulm in, 1968:32). If 
someone says: it is right to k ill one's enemy’ , he is* expressing his 
feelings with regard to a particu la r mode of action. How is one to bring 
th is person to accept the same moral feelings as we do? Does one admit 
that his moral system of values is as good as ours just because it is 
expressing his own fee lings. I find it impossible to accept that one must 
totally banish reason as A yer does and maintain that we cannot bring 
forward any arguments to show that our system is superior' (F rankena, 
1974:412).
2 .3 .3  The emphasis on attitude and language according to C .L .  
Stevenson
One attempt to improve upon the emotive theory was undertaken by C .L .  
Stevenson (1972). He examined the nature of ethical agreement and 
disagreement, and showed that there are f ir s t  of all disagreements with 
regard to bele ifs. Here one person believes that X is the answer to a 
mode of acting , while another person believes that Y  is the answer In 
addition there are also disagreements with regard to purposes, p re fe r­
ences or wants. To d istinguish these two types of disagreement (in  belief 
and in attitude) Stevenson (1972:7-8) gives a ve ry  telling example of a 
chessp layer playing with a beginner. The expert makes a ve ry  weak 
opening move, which leads on onlooker to ask him self: Does he make 
the move because he believes that it is a strong one or because, out of 
ch arity  to his opponent, he does not want to make a strong one?' 
(Stevenson, 1972:7). Here one distinguishes between a belief and a want 
(o r an a tt itu d e ).
Stevenson maintains that in the past, ethical w rite rs  have concentrated 
upon agreemnt and disagreement in belief and have totally disregarded 
the other v ital aspect of agreement and disagreement in attitude. For 
th is reason, it is Stevenson's intention to draw attention to this aspect 
of agreement and disagreement in attitudes, and to indicate the influence 
which both attitudes and beliefs execise on each o ther. In line with the 
emotive theory Stevenson maintains that moral judgments go beyond
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cognition or knowledge, but address themselves to the conative-affective 
nature of man. He shows (1972:21) that an ethical sentence is very  
sim ilar to an im perative, fo r example ’You ought to defend your country' 
is the same as Defend your country '. Stevenson sees that ethical sen­
tences are d ifferent from sentences in science: Ethical sentences have 
as the ir intention to encourage and direct the conduct of people, rather 
than to describe them. The ethical statement 'th is is wrong' means in 
actuality that I disapprove of th is ’ and then one calls upon one's hearer 
to Do the same'. In this one can see two important aspects of an ethical 
statement. 'I disapprove of this' shows that there is a disagreement 
which stems from one's attitudes. Do the same’ shows the intention of 
an ethical statement - to get the other person to redirect his attitudes 
in accordance with one’s own (Stevenson, 1972:36).
Stevenson has attempted to improve upon the emotive theory by showing 
that value judgments are not just an expression of feeling , but of a tti­
tudes and belie fs. One failing however is that he has neglected to give 
a detailed examination to the concept of attitudes (Brum m er, n .d .:1 0 4 ) . 
It remains rather unclear what he means exactly  by this term. 
Stevenson's observations show that value judgments are not just sta te­
ments of fact, neither are they ju st statements of emotions, but they are 
expressive statements in which the speaker shows a favourable or 
unfavourable attitude towaards something.
Brummer (n . d . : 109-111) indicates a rather dangerous tendency both in 
A yer and Stevenson. They have indicated that value judgments have, 
besides an exp ressive function, a function with regard to the influencing 
of another's actions. Th is  is undoubtedly a valid and true function of 
value judgments. However, the d ifficu lty  arises that they do not give 
a means to d istinguish value-judgments from propaganda, by which an­
other is manipulated casually to achieve what one desires . Man's freedom 
is not su ffic ien tly  taken into consideration, fo r the weight has been 
placed on bringing someone to do what I tell him to do and thus try ing  
to manipulate him. In this way his freedom is taken away.
2 .4  Prescriptivism
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A recent approach, which rejects descriptivism , intuitionism and 
emotivism, is that called prescrip tiv ism , which examines the ve ry  nature 
of ethics and tries to restore objectivity to it . R .M . Hare, a good pro­
ponent of prescrip tivism  has given some pungent observations with regard 
to the nature of morality and moral reasoning which are worthwhile e x ­
amining (F ran ken a , 1974:413). Moral reasoning involves the faculty of 
the will - it is p re sc rip tive . It attempts to move someone to perform a 
deed, but at the same time, it c learly  presupposes that the hearer has 
the freedom to do or not to do what is asked of him In all moral rea­
soning there is the desire to un iversa lise  and faced with the requirement 
of universalisation one is led to abandon some desires.
Hare shows great sympathy for the amoralist (someone who refuses to 
make moral judgments) because he can understand what has brought him 
to this position. For Hare the amoralist is aware of the great changes 
which are taking place in the world , but he is also aware of the fact that 
the moral rules of tradition have not kept apace with these changes. 
They often call upon a person to do something of which , upon reflection, 
fie cannot approve. Th is  leads the amoralist to the question Why should 
we have moral rules at a ll? ’ T h is  problem is experienced above all in the 
moral education of ch ild ren . Parents have acquired these morals to which 
they at least pay lip -se rv ice , but they are incapable of ju stify in g  the ir 
moral ru les. When children reach the age at which they begin to think 
m orally, they obviously sta rt to question moral ru les. If  they can obtain 
no satisfacto ry  justification for these ru le s, they will inevitably reject 
them, and with them morality as well. V e ry  often children have been 
taught that something is wrong, they know it is wrong, but they have 
never been presented with the reasons for why it is wrong (F rankena , 
1974:419). What is lacking is that they have never come to see the 
p rescrip tive  sense of moral words, namely that when one comes to the 
idea that an act is wrong, one will by that ve ry  fact refrain  from doing 
it . The best way to achieve this is to pay attention to the consequences 
of one's actions for other people. They must give as much attention to 
the interests of others as they do to their own in terests . Th is can be 
termed the consequences of tin iversa lism '. In this sense morality is no 
longer conformity to the way in which every  one acts , but it is the a t­
tempt for free agents to d iscover for themself princip les which they view 
as binding on all people. In this regard , philosophy has a v ital task
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with regard to education in m orality: it is to help one to come to a deeper 
appreciation of morality in general and to help one to see more clearly  
the consequences of one s actions for others (Frankena, 1974:422).
Hare has made a great contribution to the whole question of what morality 
is all about. He has shown in this view the place which reason must play 
in eth ics, and has restored the possibility for one to discuss freely about 
moral questions and moral judgments. Th is view has re-established the 
importance of moral rules and the way in which one arrives at them and 
makes them one's own. The aspect of universalism  in ethical judgments 
is v ital for restoring objectivity in ethical statements.
2 .5  Relativism
Perhaps one of the most distinguishing features of our present age is the 
view that everyth ing is re lative . Th is attitude has had its repercussions 
in eth ics, and it is one of the main opponents to the view that ethical 
judgments can be considered objectivily va lid . One can distinguish three 
main types of relativism  in ethics:
2 .5 .1  Situational ethics
Norms are never seen as absolute, valid and unchangeable for all times. 
The situation determines whether a norm is to be upheld or not. A clear 
example of this occurs in the situation where duties or rights conflict. 
For example, in the case of telling the tru th  an escaped convict asks 
someone at gunpoint where the judge who sentenced him to imprisonment 
was. One replies that one does not know even though one knows p e r­
fectly well where the judge is . In this situation a more important norm 
has come into p lay : the norm of protecting the life of another which in 
the situation is fa r more important than the norm of telling the tru th .
H. F letcher (1974:24) is the typical exponent of this situational 
re la tiv istic  eth ic. Th is approach upholds the rational nature of man in 
making ethical judgments and insists that all ethical judgments must be 
made according to the situation in which one is . The great danger with 
the approach is its tendency towards excess and over-emphasis when all
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norms are rejected and everyth ing becomes re lative , unpredictable, and 
amoral. Fletcher emphasises this point s trong ly . He upholds the view 
that there must be an absolute or a norm of some kind if there is to be 
re la t iv ity :
It is not anarchic ( i .e .  without an arche, an ordering p rincip le ).
In C hristian  situations the ultimate criterion is , as we shall be 
seeing, agapeic love'. It re lativ ises the absolute, it does not 
absolutist? the re lative! (F le tch e r, 1974:45).
2 .5 .2  Descriptive Relativism
Th is view is based on the notion that cu ltu res d iffe r in their basic moral 
value judgments. It results from the studies of cu ltu ra l anthropologists 
into the customs of d ifferent societies as well as the ir modes of conduct 
and the values which they hold. In the past there has been the tendency 
to stress the enormous differences between d ifferent cu ltures and socie­
ties. T lipy concluded that the customs and value judgments of cu ltures 
and nations are all re lative to their particu la r cu ltu re and as such are 
all equally valid .
During the past few years a new appraisal of the d ifferences in cu ltures 
has been made. Far more agreement is observed in the fundamental 
values of d ifferent societies. The differences emerge from the application 
of the same values to situations in d ifferent w ays.
2 .5 .3  Meta-ethical Relativism
When two (or more) opposing moral judgments are made about the same 
subject, both are judged to be true or false at the same time. Meta- 
ethical relativism  maintains that there is no method to decide which is true 
or false . It is really based upon the descrip tive relativism  in which the 
differences in the value judgments of d ifferent cu ltures are used to 
support the contention. As has been indicated, this position is fa r from 
being demonstrated: there is no clear example of un iversa l, basic d if­
ferences in fundamental basic value-judgm ents.
-32G-
3. TOWARDS A SA T ISFA C TO R Y  TH EO RY OF THE C H ARACTER  AND 
V ER IF IC A T IO N  OF ETH IC A L  STATEM EN TS
In the previous section a number of important insights into the character 
and verification of ethical statements have been presented. The know­
ledge content of an ethical statement has been righ tly  pointed out in both 
intuitionism and naturalism . Non-cognitivism has emphasised emotions 
and attitudes as another important insight into the eth'cal statement. 
Relativism has va lid ly  emphasised the situation and the context in which 
a judgment is made. "I he universalism  prescrip t of Hare is also something 
which is of v ital importance to an ethical norm. These are all valid 
points. U nfortunately , these meta-ethical approaches have also erred in 
numerous w ays, as has been indicated in the course of discussion. The ir 
major failing lies in focusing their attention on one aspect of the ethical 
statement to the entire exclusion of all other aspects. At the same time 
most of these approaches have neglected to give attention to the true 
scientific nature of ethics and the correct function which reason should 
play in ethical judgments. In th is way the ob jectiv ity  of meta-ethics was 
called into question and weakened. It  is th is fa ilu re  to pay attention to 
the sceintific nature of ethics which has hindered the above approaches 
from provid ing a satisfactory theory for the verification of ethical judg­
ments. Th is  w ill be indicated in what follows.
3.1 Theology as a science
A way of coming to objectivity in the realm of meta ethical judgments has 
to my mind been opened up by the recent attempts which have been made 
to approach theology (and hence Christian  theological ethics as a branch 
of theology) as a science. The chief exponent of th is approach is 
Wolfhart Pannenbera (1973). He has undertaken a detailed consideration 
of the relationship of theology to science, by examining the major trends 
of thought in all sc ientific  d isc ip lines. Especially  from an examination 
of the ir methods an application has been made to theology. Sceince is a 
way to knowledge, and in this regard one can speak of a science of 
theology which is a way to knowledge about God. Pannenberg is opposed 
to any form of rig id  dogmatism and absolutism and makes use of the 
methods of the scientific  disciplines in order to come to a deeper under­
standing of theology itse lf. Theology's task is not to adopt a dogmatic
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attitude towards pre-given fac ts , but to investigate the tru th  of the 
C hristian  fa ilh  (Pannenberg , 1973:419-420).
Theological e th ics , according to Pannenberg (as w itli all the other the­
ological d isc ip lines) must be considered in a scientific  way through its 
interconnections with other discip lines such as anthropology. It must 
test its judgments according to sense experience (Pannenberg , 1973:425). 
Basic to every  science is the role which reason plays in ensuring that 
the methods used, the conclusions drawn, are rational. With th is con­
tribution and conviction that theological ethics is a science, and that 
reason must exerc ise  her rig h tfu l place in this theological d iscussion , one 
can consider a basic problem raised ea rlie r , the ’ is-ought' question. As 
a result of the discussion of this problem from a scientific-rational basis 
one will open up directions towards a satisfacto ry  theory of justification .
3 .2  The is ought question and a new approach to the verification of 
ethical statements
3 .2 .1  The problem
Th is question has already been raised in 1 .2 .4  where it was shown that 
Hume raised a fundamental question which had serious repercussions in 
the field of e th ics. Th is question must be seen against the background 
of Hume s criticism  of the method of induction. Induction b rie fly  stated 
means that one constructs laws or general statements based upon ind i­
vidual instances. An example of such a general law or belief based upon 
individual instances is the view that one believes that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. T h is  is based upon the observations which have been made 
in the past. Induction from repeated events which one has experienced 
in the past leads to the projection of a law that this will or must take 
place in the fu tu re . An invalid jump has been made from the is of many 
repeated facts to the expectation or the must that the fu ture will be like 
the past.
Hume dealt with th is process of acquiring knowledge and raised two 
problems, which Karl Popper (1974:4) re fers to as the logical problem’
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and the psychological problem'. Popper formulated Hume's logical 
problem in the following way:
H : Are we justified  in reasoning from repeated instances of which 
we have experience to other instances (conclusions) of which we 
have no experience?
Hume's answer to H is :
No, however great the number of repetitions (Popper, 1974:4).
Hume rejects the process of passing from statements of fact to predictions 
of what must be in the fu tu re . He rejects the construction of general 
laws based upon individual events. T h is  leads to a fu rth e r problem, 
termed Hume's psychological problem':
H Why nevertheless do all reasonable people expect, and be­
lieve, that instances of which they have no experience will conform 
to those of which they have experience? That is , why do we 
have expectations in which we have great confidence? (Popper, 
1974:4).
Hume's answer is that people make this connection between past events 
and an expectation that the future must be like the past on the basis of 
habit or custom. Because of a reflected event in the past a mechanism 
is built up in a person by which that person associated the ideas of the 
past together. Starting with this custom of experiencing the same events 
at sim ilar circum stances, the person makes a projection into the future 
and expects the same events to occur in the fu tu re as happened in the 
past.
Although 'th is problem of Hume', as Popper (1974:4) was the f irs t  to call 
it , re ferred to knowledge in general, it applied to the realm of ethics 
with equal force. For in ethics one is accustomed to pass from statements 
of fact to statements involving a value judgment. For example:
Statement of fact: You broke that window'.
Value Judgment: 'You must admit that you broke
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it when your father asks about it'
Here is a typical mode of reasoning by which one passes immediately from 
a statement of fact to an obligation derived from this fact. For Hume 
this method would be illegitimate. One cannot base an ought upon an 
is . Is there any way in which this custom or habit of arguing in ethics 
can be justified?
3 .2 .2  Attempts to answer this problem
3 .2 .2 .1  The naturalists and the intuitionists
The natu ra lists felt that there was no real problem. They considered 
that is was possible to translate an ought into an is . For them it was 
merely a question of how one defined one s term s. The intuitionist also 
experienced no d iff icu lty : an ought remains an is , but in this case it 
ascribes a non-natural, simple property to something and views it as an 
evaluative term producing an obligation. Both these views have not really 
solved the problem of Hume. Because there are values, because I have 
knowledge of what is right and wrong, why must I do what is right or 
avoid what is wrong? The question of passing from an is to an ought 
s till remains (F ran ken a , 1974:403-404).
3 .2 .2 .2  Karl Popper
Ju s t  as the is-ought moral question must be seen against the background 
of the general question of knowledge, so too its solution, or attempted 
solution, must be seen against this background. In this regard Karl 
Popper o ffers a key to its solution. He himself is convinced that he has 
achieved a solution as he states in his opening chapter on Objective 
Knowledge (Popper, 1974:1). In his solution he supports Hume in 
maintaining that no number of empirical facts can support or ju s t ify  a 
un iversa l law as tru e . He does not reject the use of the importance of 
constructing general, un iversal laws. But these universal laws must be 
viewed in a specific way: they must be regarded as theories which always 
remain open to change, open to fa lsification . In science one draws up 
theories, or hypotheses, which are based upon empirical facts . The
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hypotheses are tested to see if and how they can be fa lsified . Laws of 
science then remain hypotheses which one is to accept only in so fa r as 
one leaves them open to refutation, or falsification. Popper came to this 
position from a realisation that in science laws which were un iversa lly  
accepted as va lid , were la te r, through d ifferent insights and research, 
rejected. A good example of this is the case in which the un iversa lly  
accepted views of Newton as regards g ra v ity  were supplanted by those 
of Einstein (Popper, 1974:9).
A general scientific  hypothesis can be seen somewhat in the way in which 
a flash light casts its beam and illuminates a part of rea lity , then another 
flash light is used to illuminate another or wider aspect of rea lity . In this 
way too another scientific hypothesis supplants the previous hypothesis 
by using d ifferent methods, d ifferent approaches, and consequently e x ­
plains reality  in a better way. The basis for Popper’s view is empiricism: 
sense data remain the background against which every scientific theory 
or hypothesis must be tested, must be fa lsified . In this way, Popper 
has preserved the ab ility  and the right fo r one to make general pred­
ictions on general laws, provided that they are not seen as absolute, 
unchangeable, but as always being open to future fu rth er change or 
fa ls ifica tio n .
3 .2 .2 .3  W.W. Bartley  III
These views of Popper with regard to the theory of the natural sciences 
were taken up by W.W. Bartley (1971) and applied to ethics with p ar­
ticu la r reference to the is-ought question within eth ics. He considered 
the particu lar relationship between evaluative statements and factual 
statements in eth ics. He began with Popper’s view that observational 
statements have a relationship to theoretical scientific statements. A 
theoretical scientific view is built up upon observational statements, and 
these observational statements are used to test, to fa ls ify  a theoretical 
scientific statement. Bartley  maintained that a moral statement can 
sometimes be logically fa lsified  by means of a factual statement. He 
showed this by means of a factual statement. He showed this by means 
of the fact that ought statements imply can with regard to persons. When 
one says that a person ought to do something, one implies that the person 
can do that th ing . The example he gives concerns the statement that
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Jones ought to be a genius’ . From this statement one concludes that 
‘Jones can be a gen ius'. But th is conclusion might prove to be false if 
one has evidence to the co n tra ry , namely that he has a ve ry  low I .Q . ,  
or has suffered some form of brain damage. Here one has used facts to 
ju s t ify  or to fa ls ify  a moral statement.
3 .3  Conclusion
An evaluative statement should be seen, in the light of Popper, as a 
hypothesis which is subject to empirical testing . This means that one 
accepts the view s, the opinions, the evaluative statements and judgments 
which have been made by others in the past. But these must not be 
accepted as unchangeable, absolute dogmas: one has the task not just 
of repeating them verbatim , or of ju st paying lip -se rv ice  to them. One 
must take them as maps indicating the d irection, but then one must 
subject them to critic ism , to testing in the desire to see whether they 
correspond to empirical fac ts , whether one can improve upon them. One 
has the obligation to test evaluative statements with reference to empirical 
data. As with the example of the flash ligh t which illuminates rea lity , 
so too a moral evaluative judgment illuminates the way in which one is 
to act. But this flash light can be replaced by a d ifferent one which may 
illuminate reality  in a d ifferent or c learer way. So too another moral 
evaluative judgment can illuminate the way in which one should act in a 
d iffe rent or clearer way The way one decides between these d ifferent 
evaluative judgments is by means of testing , by empirical fac ts . Here 
the ought is being supported, or fa lsified  by the is , and it is the is which 
gives the justification or the falsification of the ought, of why I ought 
to act in such and such a way.
There  remains one fu rth e r v ita l point to which attention must be drawn. 
What relevance does the C h ristian  faith have with regard to all that has 
been said? In 1.1 reference was made to Christian  e th ics , but all that 
has so fa r been said deals rather with meta-ethics in general, more from 
a philosophical or rational approach. In 1.1 it was shown that the 
C hristian  life should not be divorced from human life . The C hristian  life 
was presented as a fu rth e r dimension of human ethical life . Christian  
ethical th inking must take the resu lts achieved in other branches of 
science, as was shown by Pannenberg, and make use of them, applying
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them to C h ris tian ity  and particu la rly  to theology as a science of God. 
In th is respect there is no contradiction between reason and fa ith .
C h ris tian ity  should be seen as an all-embracing life-view  which has an 
integrating function of humanising - in the case of ethics - value judg­
ments as a means of following the example of Jesus of Nazareth. Th is 
life-view  is based upon a basic conviction, a fundamental option, which 
one has chosen to accept and which influences one's life . The Christian  
life-view  is not something irrational: it must always remain open to d is­
cussion and in q u iry . As Popper has shown, every  hypothesis remains 
open to criticism  and this is true fo r the Christian  life-view  as well. In 
no way is it to be presented in an absolutised and dogmatised way. 
Instead the Christian  life-view  must remain open to criticism  and in q u iry . 
The Christian  theologian (and more p a rticu la rly  the Christian  meta-ethical 
scholar) must exercise this sp ir it  of rationality by showing that Christian  
moral norms are free from contradiction, that they can be formulated 
coherently , that they are existentia lly  relevant to today, and fina lly  that 
they are un iversa lly  applicable. In this way the Christian  life view is 
constantly subjected to the processes of reason and one will constantly 
be approaching a deeper understanding of the tru th , of rea lity , and of 
man's moral actions.
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